We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective, i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers' horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.
Introduction
Health care markets are characterized by several market failures (Arrow, 1963) . As pointed out in Ma and Riordan (2002) , some institutions have emerged as a response to this issue. Ve r t i c a l integration, or more generally, vertical agreements between insurers and health care providers, are known to be an efficient response to incentive problems. Indeed, in addition to the standard argument of transaction costs reduction, putting more incentives on the providers' side, also allows managed care organizations (MCOs from here on the following) to relax the trade-off between risk spreading and copayments on the policyholders' side (Ma and McGuire, 1998) . However, the formation of health care networks in a strategic environment remains misunderstood and the MCOs' impact on policyholders' welfare is still under debate. As it has been observed that MCOs' plans are less expensive than conventional insurance, several explanations are given to understand this stylized fact. A first argument is that standards of quality differ between these two types of health insurance coverage. However, empirical evidence dealing with health care quality delivered in MCOs and conventional insurers (or fee-for-service plans) is not conclusive and presents contrasting results. MCOs' plans tend to be better in preventive services than indemnity plans. Using data from Medicare, Landon et al. (2004) reveal that, on average, MCOs are better at delivering preventive services while conventional insurers are better in curative aspects such as access and beneficiary experiences. Second, probably due to this quality specialization i.e. preventive versus curative, Baker and Corts (1996) , Landon et al. (2004) and Shimala et al. (2009) find evidence that MCOs may benefit from a favorable risk segmentation. In the same line, Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) show that although community rating regulation in New Yo r k did not generate a death spiral, New Yo r k has experienced a dramatic shift away from fee-for-service plan toward Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs from here on the following).
There are two goals to this paper. First, we shed light on this quality-price issue so as to establish a comparison, expressed in terms of policyholders' welfare, between different market structures observed in the health care sector 1 . Second, we provide a positive argument to explain the formation of health care networks. For this purpose, we consider a set-up in which two insurers and two providers are present and compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a network of health care. We consider that providers, who are partially altruistic, are horizontally dif-ferentiated. More precisely, they are characterized by different physical addresses. While they do not choose their physical address, they choose health care quality and compete in price. Then, various situations are considered. The first corresponds to the case where both insurers do not sign any exclusivity contracts with providers. This situation can be interpreted as a competition between conventional insurers. Next, we consider a situation where both insurers sign a vertical agreement with one (different) provider, this situation corresponds to a competition between MCOs.
We show that policyholders are better off under competition between conventional insurers rather than under managed care competition. This result comes from the fact that under MCOs' competition, the differentiation at the upstream level (between providers) goes down to the insurers' level, allowing them to charge a positive loading factor to their policyholders. Moreover, as it relaxes competition intensity, it induces a lower quality level in equilibrium. It is worth noticing that this insight does not coincide with Gal-Or's (1997) results in which providers are horizontally differentiated, but in an ex post perspective, i.e. ex ante policyholders do not know their preferred health care providers. Indeed, Gal-Or shows that due to lower prices paid to the providers, policyholders get higher utility under competition between integrated insurers. Ma (1997) also analyzes the vertical foreclosure strategy with (ex post) differentiated upstream firms while downstream products are sold as option contracts. From the consumers' point of view, Ma reveals that vertical integration consequences are ambiguous and can increase or reduce their welfare.
Next, we analyze the outcome of the competition between an MCO and a conventional insurer. We find that at equilibrium, insurers do not make profit on the "common provider", while the insurer who has an agreement with the other provider makes a lower profit in comparison with the exclusivity case.
Finally, we analyze the game that determines the market structure that may emerge in equilibrium. Each insurer can choose between an exclusionary and a nonexclusionary strategy. Under the first modality, patients can only obtain health care services from the provider who belongs to their insurer's network. On the contrary, under the second modality, each insurer signs contracts with both providers. Several equilibria may emerge at the outcome of the game. Nevertheless, our results show that the equilibria in which both insurers select one distinct provider, i.e. exclusionary equilibrium -allow them to reach the highest profit level.
It is interesting to analyze this result with respect to the related literature. In an automobile insurance context, Bourgeon et al. (2007) provide an analysis in which some (ex ante) horizontal differentiation is present in the providers' market. They also show that an exclusionary equilibrium emerges in equilibrium. Gal-Or (1997) considers a framework in which both levels, i.e. upstream and downstream levels, are differentiated. The author points out that a nonexclusionary equilibrium arises under the realistic assumption that providers are more differentiated than insurers 2 . Actually, this is in sharp contrast with our findings. This difference is due to the option value assumption adopted in her framework coming from the ex post horizontal differentiation. Indeed, Gal-Or (1997 ,1999 considers that ex ante, i.e. under the veil of ignorance, providers deliver health care services perceived as equivalent whereas ex post (after falling ill), each patient has a preferred provider. Due to this, policyholders may suffer from a disutility, calculated in expectation, when their choice among providers is restricted. However, Gal-Or shows that they are better off because it allows insurers to bargain lower health care prices and therefore, lower premia.
According to the difference in results obtained, it is worth discussing the conceptual difference behind these two assumptions dealing with the providers' horizontal differentiation. This assumption of ex post differentiation suits health care markets particularly well if it is interpreted as providers' specialization strategies. For instance, some hospitals can benefit from a better reputation for treating some particular pathologies. 3 In contrast, when providers' horizontal differentiation has a geographical/distance interpretation, Capps et al. (2003) point out that it is more convincing to consider that patients know ex ante their preferred providers. 4 It is worth noticing that due to this interpretation of ex ante horizontal differentiation that characterizes providers' competition, our paper may constitute the first analysis to succeed in explaining, by using only strategic interactions arguments, the health care networks formation observed in practice. Under the option value approach, Gal-Or shows that health care networks could emerge as an equilibrium only if insurers were more differentiated than providers, which does not seem to be the most realistic assumption.
In the next section, we present the set-up. Section 3 is devoted to some preliminary considerations dealing with the providers' price-quality competition issue. The comparison between different market structures of the health care sector is exposed in section 4. Section 5 provides an equilibrium analysis. Section 6 concludes.
The set-up
Three actors are considered in the model:
Policyholders: There is a unit mass of risk averse policyholders, characterized by an initial wealth w. They differ by a physical address and are uniformly located over a Hotelling line of interval [0, 1] . Each policyholder may suffer from a disease with a probability π. They have preferences described by a two-argument utility function. The first component is a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function u over his ex post wealth with u > 0 and u < 0, the concavity capturing the risk aversion. In case of illness, patients visit a provider j that provides health care of quality q j . Then, patients obtain a positive utility v(q j ), with v > 0 and v < 0. In words, the quality of health care has a positive impact on patients' health state but with decreasing return. To visit a provider j, patients entail a disutility proportional to the distance t x − x j . If healthy, policyholders obtain a wealth equal to w − k j i , where k j i denotes the premium paid to insurer i. In case of illness, patients pay a price p j to provider j and receive an indemnity s j i + k j i from insurer i. Their wealth is thus w + s j i − p j . Hence, if a policyholder takes out a health insurance contract from insurer i and buys a service of quality q j offered by provider j at price p j in case of illness, his expected utility can be written
Providers: Suffering from an illness, policyholders can visit two providers, denoted by j ∈ {0,1}. For purpose of simplicity, we assume that each provider has the same cost function c(q) that depends on the quality q delivered with c > 0 and c ≥0. The two providers are located at the extremities of the segment of length 1, namely at x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1 for providers j = 0 and j = 1 respectively. Each provider j's decides simultaneously on the quality standard q j of health care delivered to patients and sets the price p j . The number of patients that visit provider j then depends on the providers' price policies and the insurance contracts. Denoting by X j i the number of policyholders having an insurance contract from insurer i that visit provider j, her total demand is thus ∑ i X j i . Provider j's objective is given by:
under the constraint p j ≥c(q j ), where
is the provider's per-patient utility that depends on two components. The firstone is the provider net remuneration p j − c(q j ). The second component denotes the altruism of the provider. Roughly speaking, providers put a weight γ on their patients' utility 5 . γ = 0 implies that the providers are pure profit maximizers, and of course, we must have γ small enough to ensure that p j > c(q j ), which we assume in the following. 6 Insurers: Two insurers, denoted by i = {A,B} offer health plan contracts
that depend on the structure of providers' affiliation that we detail in the following. If for example k 0 i = k 1 i = k i and s 0 i = s 1 i = s i (same insurance contracts with whomever the policyholder wants to visit), the profit function of insurer i is given by:
where D i denotes the total number of policyholders of insurer i. More generally, we have
The timing of the game is the following:
1. Insurers decide on the provider(s) they affiliate. If a provider j does not appear in health plan i, we adopt the convention that k j i = s j i = 0. 2. Insurers offer health plans {k j i ,s j i } with i ∈ {A,B} and j ∈ {0,1} and simultaneously, providers j post prices p j and choose their standard of quality q j . 3. Given the observed health plans and providers prices, patients choose at most one insurance. 4. Finally, if sick, policyholders visit a provider among those who are affiliated to their insurer. 5 This representation of the altruism follows the contract theory approach (for instance see Shchetinin, 2009). It can be noticed that in the health economics literature, analysis that focus on providers' regulation usually consider that providers' altruism only concerns their patients' health state function. This is a specific case of our formulation where the providers' altruistic component deals with the entire patients' utility (it is also the case in Liu and Ma [2010] ). This assumption allows us to capture how providers may be concerned by the price charged on their patients. As pointed out in Bardey and Lesur (2006) , it is also a manner to capture the fact that it becomes more difficult for providers to induce their patients' demand when they have to pay a higher price for health care treatments. Nevertheless, in the appendix, we show that our results remain unchanged if we consider an altruism component dealing exclusively with patients' health benefits. 6 For γ large, the provider j's program is to maximize patients' utility under a break-even con-
Of course, at the optimum we have p j = c(q j ) and the optimal quality level solves u w + s j i − c(q j ) c (q j ) = v (q j ) and thus depends on the health plan net indemnity.
Preliminary considerations
Before comparing different health care organizations, we determine the social optimum from an ex ante and ex post points of view. 7 Because of policyholders' risk aversion, ex ante, the first-best is characterized by full insurance, i.e. s = k − p against an actuarial premium: k = πc(q). Ex post, the socially efficient level of health care quality q FB is solution of max q u(w − πc(q)) + πv(q), and thus solves
The first-best quality level q FB satisfies the equality between the marginal benefit generated by health care and its marginal cost. It is worth noticing that this marginal cost is calculated for an actuarial value of the premium πc(q FB ). These considerations are summed-up in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The first best allocation is characterized by: i) Full insurance against an actuarial premium πc(q FB ).
ii) A level of quality that satisfies:
The level of quality obtained in the first best and the premium corresponding allow us to compare and to assess the allocation efficiency corresponding to the different market structures depicted in the next section.
Interestingly, we shall see in the following that at an equilibrium where the insurers charge the same premium k, providers j' optimal quality satisfies the condition
whatever γ, the level of the providers' altruism. While the providers' altruism does not explicitly appear in this equation, it influences the nature of the equilibrium; an effect that is embedded in the insurance premium level. A total differentiation of the previous equation gives:
Lemma 2 The level of quality delivered decreases with the insurer's premium.
Hence, if the providers' prices exceed the cost of service, which is typically the case when the altruism coefficient is low, or if insurers apply a positive loading factor on premia, the quality of the health service is lower than the first-best level. More generally, a negative shock on patients' income reduces the quality provided i.e. health care quality is a normal good, as pointed out in Manning and Marquis (1996) . This result comes from a wealth effect due to the concavity of the utility function (with respect to wealth).
In the appendix, we exhibit the robustness of this result. More precisely, we show that under the alternative representation of the providers' altruism i.e. when the provider's altruism only considers health benefits v(q), the quality still decreases with the insurance premium.
Comparison of different market structures
In this section, we analyze and compare different affiliation structures. First, we consider a competition between conventional insurers, i.e. insurance companies affiliate both providers: insurer j then charges the same premium k 0 j = k 1 j = k j and reimburses the same indemnity k j + s j whatever the provider chosen by the policyholder. Second, we consider the competition between insurers which adopt an MCO form, i.e. exclusive affiliation of provider. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of the game when an MCO competes with a conventional insurer.
Conventional insurance
In the non-exclusive affiliation case, both insurers have affiliated both providers. Figure 1 represents the situation under consideration.
We directly focus on symmetric equilibria of that subgame in which insurers offer the same policy, i.e. k 
Competition between insurers
In such a situation, insurers are not differentiated in the sense that policyholders can visit whoever health provider they like in the case they get sick. Hence, insurers compete in a framework of perfect competition. Therefore, competition between insurers leads them to solve the following program: Introducing the insurers' budget constraint in the objective function leads to:
The equilibrium in this subgame involves full insurance for policyholders and actuarial premia.
Competition between providers
A proportion π of policyholders suffer from a disease and are willing to buy health care treatments offered by providers in the market. Let us denote by˜x the address over [0,1] that defines the marginal patient who is indifferent between provider 0 and 1. We havẽ
and demands for provider 0 and 1 are given by X 0 = π˜x and X 1 = π(1 −˜x) respectively. Provider j's program is
Assuming that providers are relatively selfish, i.e. γ is low enough, we have p j > c(q j ). Therefore, the optimal price and quality delivered by provider 0's, given the health service of provider 1, verify the following first-order conditions:
and,
Combining these two expressions, we get
as mentioned above. At the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:
Lemma 3 When γ is low, i.e. p * > c(q * ), health care price and quality are given by the following system:
Equation (4) reveals that providers obtain some rents in equilibrium due to the horizontal differentiation that characterizes their market. In particular, if providers are selfish, (4) becomes
with the first-best situation at the limit case t = 0. However, if providers are sufficiently altruistic, i.e. γ large enough to have p = c(q), the first-best situation is the result of the market competition even when t > 0 since insurance premia are actuarially fair. More generally, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium (p * ,q * ,s * ,k * ) with conventional insurance:
1. Insurers offer full coverage at actuarial price: s * = (1 − π)p * and k * = π p * . 2. If providers are relatively selfish, the price of health service verifies p * > c(q * ), the quality level of health services is lower than the first best value i.e. q * < q FB and the corresponding insurance premium high k * > k FB . Otherwise, q * = q FB and p * = c(q FB ).
Proposition 1 says that competition between conventional insurers allows to achieve the ex ante efficiency criterion. When providers are sufficiently altruistic, they also choose the first-best quality level and set a price equal to its marginal cost. On the contrary, if they are more selfish, they obtain a positive mark-up p * − c(q * ) and they choose a quality standard lower than the first best level. Finally, it is worth noticing that in spite of the ex ante providers' differentiation, there is no market failure in a competition between conventional insurers as long as providers are sufficiently altruistic.
Competition between MCOs
Let us now consider the case of exclusive affiliation. Without loss of generality, we consider that insurer A makes a contract with provider 0 while insurer B has an agreement with provider 1 as illustrated in Insurers' plans thus verify {k 1 A ,s 1 A } = {k 0 B ,s 0 B } = {0,0} and, as we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, {k 0 A ,s 0
Competition in contracts between insurers
In this framework, patients have to visit the provider affiliated to their insurer. As usual, the horizontal differentiation that characterizes providers' competition drops to the health insurance market. The marginal policyholder, the individual who is indifferent between the two providers, is located at
which also corresponds to the demand addressed to insurer A (and 1 −˜x to insurer B). Insurer A maximizes its profit:
At a symmetric equilibrium, the premium and the indemnity are then characterized as follows:
ˆŝ +k =ˆp, k = πˆp + πt/u (w +ˆs−ˆp).
The equilibrium of this subgame indicates that policyholders still benefit from full insurance in spite of the positive loading factor charged by the insurers i.e. ex ante efficiency is still achieved.
Competition at the providers' level
At the upstream level, under exclusive agreements, the provider gets a fraction π of the insurer who belongs to the same network. Hence, provider 0's problem can be written as max
Still assuming that γ is low enough, the first-order conditions are similar to (1) and (2). We obtain:
Lemma 4 In a symmetric equilibrium with exclusive affiliation p,ˆq, s,k : i) Insurers offer full coverage at non actuarial price:ˆs+k =ˆp andk−πˆp = πt/u (w +ˆs−ˆp).
ii) If providers are relatively selfish, the quality and the price of health services verify v (ˆq) = c (ˆq)u (w −k).
As observed above, the exclusive affiliation structure allows insurers to capture some of the providers' rent since the premia are not actuarial in equilibrium. This result is standard in the vertical integration literature in general, and depicted in Ma (1997) for the health care sector. Even though ex ante insurers are identical, vertical agreements allow them to take advantage of the horizontal differentiation that characterizes the providers' market (embedded in t > 0). The quality of the providers' service follows the same rule as in the non-exclusive affiliation case: it corresponds to the level of quality that maximizes the patients' utility under the constraint of reaching a minimum mark-up level. However, as the premium is no longer actuarially fair,k and k * take different values. It affects both the quality and price values. The next proposition compares the allocations obtained in the two affiliation structure, i.e. non-exclusive and exclusive affiliations:
Proposition 2 Compared to non-exclusive affiliation, exclusive affiliation induces: i) A lower provider price:ˆp < p * . ii) A lower health service quality:ˆq < q * . iii) An higher premium:k > k * .
Proof. See appendix.
Consequently, policyholders reach a higher expected utility under non-exclusive affiliation than under exclusive affiliation thanks to a higher quality and a lower premium. Providers are worse off. First, they obtain a lower mark-up. Second, they provide a lower quality, reducing the altruism argument of their utility function. Insurers are better off because the exclusive affiliation transfers the providers' differentiation at the downstream level.
Proposition 2 does not mean that in a market where a MCO and a conventional insurer compete with each other, policyholders that have chosen the conventional insurer would necessarily be better off than policyholders affiliated to the MCO. Proposition 2 only shows that policyholders are better off in a competition between conventional insurers rather than in a competition between MCOs. The mixed duopoly properties are analyzed in the next sub-section.
MCO vs conventional insurer competition
The last case considered occurs when an insurer, say A, affiliates only one provider, say 0, while B affiliates both providers. This situation is represented in the following figure.
Customers Provider 0
Provider 1 Insurer A Insurer B Figure 3 : MCO vs conventional insurer.
Because the two insurers offer a health plan for provider 0, competition is fierce and results in health plans with complete insurance at actuarially fair premia for this provider. Then, we have
and, s A = s 0 B = (1 − π)p 0 , and no insurer extracts a rent from provider's 0 health plan. Indeed, if it were not the case, each insurer could undercut its rival to attract its rival's policyholders.
In contrast, individuals who choose provider 1 are all insured by insurer B 8 . Insurer B determines its offer (k 1 B ,s 1 B ) for provider 1 by solving:
where˜x is defined by (5). The first order conditions lead to:
Policyholders who choose B thus have full insurance. Insurer B benefits from its provider's market power to charge a positive loading factor in the premium. However, insurer B's profit is lower than under the exclusive affiliation case, while insurer A makes no profit (see Bourgeon et al. [2008] for a similar result). 8 We have also explored the situation in which insurer B affiliates both providers but offer a unique insurance contract containing cross-subsidies. However, in such content, there is no equilibrium.
Market structureÎ
n the previous section, all the possible affiliation structures have been reviewed. Following Gal-Or (1997), we can now determine whether some of them are more likely than others to emerge by considering the first stage of the game: at the very beginning, before insurers and providers make their offer, insurers choose noncooperatively to affiliate one or both providers. Denote byˆR the insurer profit under exclusive affiliation, i.e.ˆR = [(1−π)ˆp− s]/2. As shown in the previous subsection, the profit of the insurance company which affiliates both providers in the asymmetric affiliation case is strictly smaller thanˆR : it makes no profit on the insureds who have chosen the provider shared with its rival, and due to this fierce competition, the market share on its exclusive provider is reduced. To reduce the notational burden, its profit in that case is denoted byˆR − η (withˆR > η > 0) without loss of generality.
For the sake of clarity, the payoffs for the insurers in the different configurations are summarized in Table 1 . A look at this table reveals that there are tree Nash equilibria of this affiliation game: two of them correspond to exclusive affiliation ((Provider 0, Provider 1) and (Provider 1, Provider 0)), while (Provider 0&1, Provider 0&1) is the conventional insurance situation. As the exclusive affiliation cases correspond to the higher profits levels, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 The affiliation game has three Nash equilibria: the two exclusive affiliation structures and the non-exclusive affiliation structure. From the insurers' standpoint, the exclusive affiliation equilibria Pareto-dominate the non-exclusive affiliation equilibrium.
If insurer A decides to affiliate exclusively one provider, it is an optimal decision for the rival insurer B to affiliate exclusively the remaining provider: indeed, choosing not to compete with the segment of patients who visit provider 0 softens the competition between providers and allows insurer B to raise his profit.
Conclusion
The model provided allows us to point out several results dealing with the network issue in health care markets. The first part of the model is devoted to the comparison of policyholders' welfare according to the market structure considered. First, we show that policyholders' welfare is higher under competition between conventional insurers rather than under competition between MCOs. Second, we reveal that in the case of asymmetric affiliation, one insurer makes no profit while the other realizes a profit lower rather than in the case of exclusive situation.
The last part of the paper characterizes the market structure endogenously. We show that exclusive affiliation structures emerge in the equilibrium of the game. This result is in sharp contrast with previous findings that deal with this issue. We identify that the source of this difference is the assumption of horizontallydifferentiated providers. In this paper, we consider that policyholders' preferences, according to the set of providers, are determined ex ante and not ex post. If the two assumptions make sense and correspond to different aspects of the horizontal dimension, it is interesting to note that only an ex ante horizontal differentiation framework explains the formation of health care networks that we observe in practice.
This paper could be extended in different ways. First, as considered in Bijlsma et al. (2010) , it would be worth analyzing the impact of the equilibrium when a positive mass of consumers remains uninsured. It could change the nature of the equilibrium and modify the conclusion in terms of welfare comparisons. Second, due to the fact that the results obtained in the literature are sharply different, it would be interesting to consider a bi-dimensional horizontal differentiation, i.e. ex ante as in the present paper and ex post, as in Gal-Or (1997 , 1999 and Ma (2002) in order to characterize some different regions of equilibria obtained according to the set of parameters. Finally, it would be useful to analyze more closely the providers' choice of network they want to be affiliated with. Such an approach could benefit from the two-sided market perspective, as is considered in Bardey and Rochet (2010) .
A Alternative providers' altruism
Consider here that provider j's objective is given by:
under the constraint p j ≥c(q j ), where φ(q, p) = p − c(q) + γv(q).
At an equilibrium where the insurers charge the same premium k, the provider optimal quality satisfies the condition u (w − k) c (q) − γv (q) = v (q).
Total differentiation gives:
< 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
The levels of quality supplied in each affiliation case satisfyˆq = Q(k) and q * = Q(k * ) where Q(k) is the function implicitly defined by v (Q) = c (Q)u (w − k).
A total differentiation gives Q (k) = c u /[c u − v ] < 0, implying thatˆq < q * if k > k * . Ask > πˆp, let us denotek =ˆτπˆp whereˆτ > 1 and recall that k * = π p * . The providers' first-order conditions can be written as ψ γ (ˆp,τ) = t = ψ γ (p * ,1) where We thus have ψ 0 (ˆp,1) < ψ 0 (ˆp,ˆτ) = ψ 0 (p * ,1) implyingˆp < p * . Now, suppose that k≤k * which impliesˆq≥q * and since u(·) is concave, u (w − k * )≥u (w −k). As ˆp < p * , we haveˆp − c(ˆq) < p * − c(q * ) and thus t = [ˆp − c(ˆq)] u (w −k) < [p * − c(q * )] u (w − k * ) = t, hence a contradiction. We thus havek > k * andˆq < q * . As ψ γ (p,τ) is continuous in γ for γ close to zero, these results are not challenged for γ > 0 as long as γ is small. Observe that these results are not challenged when providers are very altruistic. Indeed, we have p * = c(q * ) with q * solving χ(q * ,1) = 0 andˆp = c(ˆq) with χ(ˆq,ˆτ) = 0 where χ(q,τ)≡q − Q(τπc(q)). As ∂ χ(q,τ) ∂q = 1 − Q (τπc(q))τπc (q) > 0 and, ∂ χ(q,τ) ∂τ = −Q (τπc(q))πc(q) > 0 it comes χ(ˆq,1) < χ(ˆq,ˆτ) = χ(q * ,1) implyingˆq < q * , and thus p * >ˆp. q * maximizes u(w+s * −c(q))+v(q) leading to u (w−k * ) = v (q * )/c (q * ) andˆq maximizes u(w +ˆs− c(q)) + v(q). As
the concavity of u(·) implies u (w −k) = v (ˆq)/c (ˆq) > v (q * )/c (q * ) = u (w − k * ), and thusk > k * .
